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I. Introduction
“[S]chool authorities are clearly charged with the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. If
school
authorities
fail
in
their
affirmative
obligations[,] . . . judicial authority may be invoked. Once
a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs
is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies.”1
“Can we say in 1969 that a State has no duty to
disestablish a dual system of higher education based
upon race? The three-judge court in a careful opinion
seems to draw a line between elementary and secondary
schools on one hand and colleges and universities on the
other. The inference is that if this were an elementary
school, the result would be different.”2

A long line of scholarship evaluates the work of the United
States Supreme Court in effecting social change. Much of this
scholarship centers on the role of the Supreme Court in creating,
defining, and shaping racial equality rights and remedies. In a
series of legal battles in the first decades of the twentieth
century, civil rights advocates engaged in a lengthy and
deliberate strategy to break the back of legal apartheid in
American education by challenging the constitutionality of state
policies barring African Americans from matriculation in
exclusively white public colleges and universities throughout
1. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16
(1971) (citations and quotations omitted) (finding that school systems that are in
full compliance with Brown I may have fluctuating demographic patterns, and
district courts should not intervene unless those entities deliberately altered the
demographic composition of schools) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)) [hereinafter Brown I].
2. See Ala. State Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. & Coll. Auth., 393 U.S.
400, 401 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (holding that this law is local as
opposed to a state-wide law, thus “not requiring a three-judge court.”).
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southern and border states.3 The strategy resulted in several
Supreme Court opinions that articulate the early contours of a
constitutional right to racial equality in educational opportunity.4
The strategy then moved to litigating for equality in primary and
secondary education.5 Ultimately, in the 1954 Brown I decision, a
unanimous Supreme Court declared that state-sanctioned racial
segregation in education violated the Constitution.6 The Brown
Court clearly defined a constitutional right to desegregated
education in the context of public elementary and secondary

3. Alan Krueger et al., Race, Income and College in 25 Years: The
Continuing Legacy of Segregation and Discrimination 8–9 (Princeton Univ.
Educ.
Research
Section,
Working
Paper
No.
9,
2004)
https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/108krueger.pdf. “Southern and
border states” refer to the seventeen states that maintained clear, statesponsored systems of segregation in public higher education at the time:
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
4. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950) (explaining that
Texas offered substantially unequal educational opportunities to black law
students compared to their white counterparts, and finding that Texas was
constitutionally required to admit African American applicants to white law
school); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641
(1950) (describing that state imposed restrictions requiring an African American
student to sit in a row specified for colored students, at segregated table in the
library, and a special table in cafeteria deprived the student of his personal and
present right to equal protection of the laws); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla. , 332 U.S. 632, 632–33 (1948) (requiring University of Oklahoma to
compel admittance and enrollment in the law school to African American
applicant); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (finding
that “equal opportunity for legal training within the State was not furnished”
and “that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the State
University.”); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936) (showing first
recognition by any court of the inequality of segregated higher education, the
Maryland Court of Appeals ordered the University of Maryland to admit Donald
G. Murray, a black applicant, to its law school).
5. See generally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON
HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983) (exploring the strategy
leading up to Brown v. Board of Education); see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–50 (2d ed.
2004).
6. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 (stating “[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal[; t]herefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are . . . deprived of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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schools.7 One year later, the Supreme Court decided upon a
remedial course to make this abstract duty a reality. In Brown II,
the Supreme Court declared that public schools in the United
States must desegregate with “all deliberate speed.”8 At this time,
activists with limited resources turned their focus on enforcing
the remedial decrees in the context of primary and secondary
education, curbing their efforts in the context of higher education.
This Essay offers a brief examination of the desegregation of
American public higher education as an illustration of the critical
importance of adjudicatory remedies in helping to effectuate
social change.
The difficulty in implementing effective remedies, the
seeming intractability of racial, spatial, and socioeconomic
inequities, and the judicial retreat from civil rights injunctions as
a method of relief in more recent decades has led to scholars
questioning the efficacy of equitable decrees in remedying school
segregation.9 Yet, in Brown’s wake, subsequent court decisions
demarcating the equitable requirements necessary to give
meaning to the articulated constitutional right, coupled with
legislative and administrative directives10 fostered long-awaited,
7. See id. at 492 (citing higher education cases as the foundation for its
ruling).
8. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown
II] (discussing a remedial scheme for segregated school systems).
9. See generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2006); see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, Constraints
Conditions, and the Courts, in Part 1 Civil Rights, in THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 72-106 (1991) (discussing the
ineffectiveness of injunctions).
10. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits racial discrimination by
any entity receiving federal funds. To facilitate enforcement, the United States
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was
allowed to deny federal funds to any educational institution engaging in racial
segregation. HEW’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) was given the power to enforce
Title VI. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare—Effectuation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 16298, 16299–300 (Dec. 4, 1964) (amended
by 32 Fed. Reg. 14556); Miscellaneous Amendments, 38 Fed. Reg. 17982 (July 5,
1973); see generally Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration
Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008) (examining the
role of Title VI enforcement power on school desegregation).
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significant advancements toward racial equality in educational
opportunity.11 Such changes were most evident in elementary and
secondary schools. Due to a combination of factors, including the
limited resources of desegregation advocates, the complex nature
of higher education desegregation, and the unpredictability of
Supreme Court case selection, primary and secondary education
was the subject of all of the Supreme Court’s equitable decrees in
the wake of Brown.12 In the years following the Brown ruling, the
Supreme Court offered no equitable remedial structure specific to
American higher education.13 Eventually, some public colleges
11. See, e.g., AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES NOW: THE STORY OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION’S GRADUATES (2008) (explaining that the most effective
period of school desegregation took place between 1970 and 1990 when court
ordered equitable remedies were at their strongest); see also JOHN R. LOGAN &
DEIRDRE OAKLEY, LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REG'L
RESEARCH, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY, THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE
BROWN DECISION: COURT ACTION AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1960–2000, at 2
(2004) (illustrating that through consent decrees, advocates have affected more
than simply the racial composition of elementary and secondary school
classrooms, us[ing] equitable decrees to address newer forms of racial inequality
such as resource inequality, racial segregation in special education classes, and
discipline referrals); Lia Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goals
in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 197–200 (2005) (discussing the
value of racially integrated schools).
12. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971)
(granting district court ample freedom to fashion remedies to desegregate
schools, including court-mandated busing, redrawing of attendance zone lines,
and using mathematical ratios); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–40
(1968) (exploring how freedom-of-choice plans placed an undue burden on black
schoolchildren and were unacceptable when more expedient and effective
methods of desegregation were available); see also Green, 391 U.S. at 435
(listing the factors to be considered in determining whether a public school has
fulfilled its duty to desegregate, including student assignments, facilities, staff
assignments,
faculty
assignments,
extracurricular
activities,
and
transportation); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201–04 (1973)
(recognizing Latinos’ rights to desegregation and deciding that school districts
have an affirmative duty to desegregate all city schools, even if school officials
only instituted segregated schools in a portion of said district); Alexander v.
Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (“The obligation of every school
district is to terminate the dual systems at once and to operate now and
hereafter only unitary schools.”).
13. It is important to note, however, that the decisions never expressly
limited the scope to elementary and secondary schools. Rather, they spoke of
“public education.” See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 436 (“[A] unitary, nonracial
system of public education is the ultimate end to be brought about under
Supreme Court decisions declaring unconstitutional segregated school systems”)
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and universities, understanding the importance of Brown, took
voluntary steps to eliminate the vestiges of racial segregation and
discrimination from their admissions processes. As a result of
such voluntary actions, however, public universities faced
defensive court battles by white plaintiffs who argued that raceconscious admissions policies violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.14 These battles gave rise
to a distinct form of affirmative action jurisprudence, where
courts examined the constitutionality of voluntarily adopted raceconscious policies designed to “further student body diversity”
rather than as policies designed to remedy the present effects of
past racial segregation and discrimination.15 The remedial aspect
of institutional restructuring in higher education was lost. This
loss has resulted in higher education desegregation being defined
in a context outside of the remedial dismantling of apartheid
norms. In the absence of judicial oversight, foes of this
dismantling have been able to capture the terminology and bend
it to suit their purposes.
While adjudicatory remedies are not the sole solution, courts
play a powerful role in creating the equitable remedies that give
meaning to constitutional rights.16 Indeed, some scholars have
(emphasis added); Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“The doctrine of ‘separate
but equal’ has no place in the field of public education.”).
14. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277–78 (1978)
(“[Bakke] alleged that the Medical School’s special admissions program operated
to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
15. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that
“[a]ttaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper
institutional mission[,]” and that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that can justify using race in university admissions); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (ruling that the policy of automatically granting large
numbers of “points” to every underrepresented minority applicant was not
narrowly tailored to state’s compelling interest in attaining diversity); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 312–14 (“[T]he attainment of a diverse student body is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education[;] . . .
however, ethnic diversity is only one element in a range of factors which a
university may properly consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous
student body.”).
16. In previous work, I have examined both the historic significance and
future possibilities of non-adjudicatory measures—such as administrative and
regulatory equality directives—in effecting change. See Lia Epperson,
Legislating Inclusion, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 91 (2012) (situating recent
jurisprudence on the Constitution’s commitment to ending racial segregation in
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written extensively on the role of adjudicatory remedies shaping
the right itself.17 In the context of American public elementary
and secondary schools, equitable decrees helped shape the
trajectory of equality.18 It may be nearly impossible to detail the
precise ways in which such court-based racial remedies fostered
change apart from the legislative enactments and administrative
directives that came in Brown’s wake.19 It is clear, moreover, that
social movements and the role of the United States in the global
push for democracy—through so-called “domino-effect”20
policies—during the Cold War had a significant impact on the
public education in the framework of congressional power to enact enforcement
legislation); Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations
and Legislative Opportunities, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 216 (2011) (arguing
that “[t]here is a unique opportunity to bridge the divide between constitutional
ideals and practice in the realm of racial equality in education.”); see generally
Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the Executive Branch in
Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10
BERKELEY J. OF AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008) (arguing that the Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights plays an extremely important role in
addressing persistent racial isolation and inequality in educational
opportunity).
17. See Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (positing that the scope of a right is
determined by the scope of the available remedy); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 235 (1995) (“Everyone professionally involved with law knows
that, as Holmes put it, judges legislate ‘interstitially,’ which is to say they make
law, only more cautiously, more slowly, and in more principled, less partisan,
fashion than legislators.”).
18. See, e.g., Kristin A. Ballenger, Honors Thesis, The Grave Disparities in
Modern Education, Segregation, and School Budgeting: A Comparison Between
Brown v. Board of Education and San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, U. of Tenn. Honors Thesis Projects 1, 26 (2014),
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1686/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017)
(noting that the resurgence of present day segregation in public schools ensued
after courts concluded that desegregation efforts could be eliminated) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
19. See infra Part III (discussing public higher education and the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to articulate equitable remedies for higher education
segregation).
20. The impact of post-Brown legislative and administrative initiatives
may be similar to Dwight Eisenhower’s “Domino theory.” See Peter T. Leeson &
Andrea M. Dean, The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation,
53 AM. J. POL’Y SCI. 533, 533 (2009) (“You have a row of dominoes set up, you
knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty
that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a
disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”).
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resulting change.21 Yet, adjudicatory remedies held a unique
space in providing a forceful mandate for the destabilization of
existing apartheid norms.22 The pronouncements in the
jurisprudential progeny of Brown II gave meaning to the
constitutional remedy first detailed in that case. The
destabilization of the deeply entrenched racial segregation and
discrimination in public elementary and secondary schools
brought by such adjudicatory remedies provided a fertile ground
for the implementation of administrative directives and other
non-adjudicatory equality measures.23 Thus, the critical
importance of equitable remedies in this context is the space that
court ordered remedies created for many innovative avenues for
change.
In the context of public higher education, however, no such
adjudicatory remedies came from the Supreme Court until nearly
forty years after Brown. Until that time, state systems of higher
education had no judicial mandate to affirmatively eliminate the
vestiges of a century-old segregated system in the way that
primary education did. This absence of equitable remedies
ordered by the Supreme Court meant that state systems of higher
education could maintain racially unequal systems for decades
after Brown. Similarly, without court-based remedies to
destabilize the status quo, there wasn’t the requisite space for the
non-adjudicatory remedies24 that proved essential to the

21. See infra Part III (describing how social movements and related
geopolitical activity helped foster an environment conducive to effectuating the
court-ordered remedies and spurring change).
22. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL
POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (examining
existing apartheid norms).
23. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287–88 (1977) (upholding
remedial education programs combatting school segregation); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (permitting federal
courts to order busing, student ratios, and attendance zones to desegregate
schools); United States v. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235–37 (1969) (upholding
mathematical ratios to desegregate faculty and staff). But see Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737–48 (1974) (invalidating desegregation injunction as
overly broad, as it affected non-party, suburban school districts).
24. See infra Part II.C (describing the relationship between social
movements and adjudicatory remedies).
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furtherance of public elementary and secondary school
desegregation.25
The struggle to desegregate public higher education shows
how valuable opportunities for social change may be lost when
the court fails to connect a constitutional remedy to the
articulated right. As Owen Fiss expressed, “[r]ights and remedies
are but two phases of a single social process—of trying to give
meaning to our public values. Rights operate in the realm of
abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality.”26 In the
absence of any judicially articulated remedy, public colleges and
universities did not properly give meaning to the right to racial
equality articulated in Brown.
This essay examines some of the collective forces that have
hindered the articulation and enforcement of equitable remedies
in the realm of public higher education. Part II of this essay
examines the jurisprudential road to defining the constitutional
right to desegregated education, as well as the remedy to make
that right a practical reality.27 Part III highlights the most
critical issues hindering effective constitutional injunctions to
remedy American public higher education.28 These include those
factors that distinguish higher education from elementary and
secondary schools, the unique development of the public system
of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the
United States as a tool to entrench segregation, and the lack of
adjudicatory and administrative remedies articulated for higher
education in the wake of the Brown decision.29 This section also
highlights Maryland’s public university system as a concrete
25. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022–25 (2004)
(arguing that judicial remedies flowing from public law cases such as school
desegregation litigation provided rights to destabilize racially segregated public
schools that previously failed to provide constitutionally required equality and
have resisted political change).
26. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,
52 (1979) (discussing why judges are charged with crafting remedies).
27. See infra Part II (describing the litigation strategies and court decisions
that paved the way for a constitutional right to desegregated education).
28. See infra Part III (explaining possible reasons for lack of satisfactory
remedies).
29. See infra Part III (noting the historical contexts, and the consequences,
of different situational factors that have prevented adequate remedies).

352

23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 343 (2017)

example of some of the aforementioned issues.30 Finally, Part IV
outlines some of the normative implications of this history of
ineffective injunctive relief and potential for extrajudicial
enforcement and directives.31
II. The Antecedents and Progeny of Brown: Identifying the
Constitutional Right and Remedy in Educational Equality Cases
“It is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”32

A. Racial Equality in Higher Education Cases: Identifying a
Constitutional Right
The litigation strategy employed to dismantle pervasive
racial discrimination and segregation in the United States has at
its roots civil rights leaders’ efforts to extirpate segregation in
public higher education.33 Since their inception and well into the
1960s, public colleges and universities in the United States closed
their doors to black applicants. Prior to the end of the Civil War,
the majority of blacks in the United States lived as slaves in the
Southern states, where they were prohibited by law or social
custom from learning to read or write.34 At the end of the
nineteenth century, federal funding35 spurred the creation of a
two-tiered system of public universities. Southern and border
states created historically black colleges and universities, for a
30. See id.. (proving the issues that inhibit sufficient remedies, through a
case study on Maryland’s public university system).
31. See infra Part IV (noting the overall effect of remedies in aiding social
reform).
32. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the
foundational principle of “judicial review.”).
33. See MCNEIL, supra note 5, at 133–35 (describing the beginnings of the
process that was used to break down racial segregation in schools).
34. The Slave Experience: Education, Arts, & Culture, Historical Overview,
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/slavery/experience/education/history2.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2017).
35. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–29 (2012) (requiring payments to endow and
maintain “colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts” and
allowing colleges to establish separate schools for “white” and “colored”
students, as long as the schools received equal funding).
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host of reasons, though all aimed at ensuring blacks did not gain
access to traditionally white institutions.36 At the time, the black
colleges and universities were limited to vocational training,
leaving blacks without any avenues for liberal arts education or
graduate training.37 The Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in Plessy
v. Ferguson38 upholding racial segregation further entrenched
this two-tier system.
Thus, the litigators dedicated to dismantling this system of
racial inequality, one that had been sewn into the fabric of
American institutions, mounted a well-structured attack.39 The
litigation strategy, developed with an understanding of limited
legal resources, the location of willing plaintiffs, and the local and
national social and political milieu, began by filing suits against
segregated higher education, and then moved to suits for
equalization of teacher salaries and finally against primary and
secondary education.40 The NAACP, which developed the
litigation strategy and argued all cases before the Supreme
Court, chose to begin the attack with segregated higher education
largely because plaintiffs were more readily available.41
Thousands of blacks graduated from black four-year colleges,
36. See Lynch v. State, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155012, at
*8 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) (“Strict white control was the hallmark of
black higher education in the state until the 1970’s.”).; Sean B. Seymore, Note,
I’m Confused: How Can the Federal Government Promote Diversity in Higher
Education Yet Continue to Strengthen Historically Black Colleges?, 12 WASH. &
LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 287, 294−98 (2006) (detailing the history of HBCUs
and examining the government’s seemingly contradictory position of supporting
integration in higher education while promoting the maintenance of HBCUs).
37. See UNITED STATES OFFICE OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE
HIGHER EDUCATION OF NEGROES, VOL. II: GENERAL STUDIES OF COLLEGES FOR
NEGROES 14–15 (1942) (showing that by 1940, only two of the approximately
thirty black public colleges in the Southern and border states included a
professional school when, at the time, there were more than 100 professional
programs offered at white public colleges in these states).
38. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (repudiating the
principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and creating the legal doctrine
of “separate but equal,” which allowed states to require and enforce racial
segregation and discrimination).
39. See MCNEIL, supra note 5, at 133–40 (discussing the landscape prior to
Brown).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 137–39 (explaining the reasons why the NAACP chose to
begin the battle of desegregation with higher education).
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many of whom sought graduate education. College-educated
blacks seeking graduate degrees were readily available, and
given the level of racial hostility at the time, poking the figurative
beast was simply more suitable for adult plaintiffs. A plaintiff in
an elementary or secondary school lawsuit may risk parental
unemployment and the child’s safety. Finally, advocates could
espouse a clear legal theory in graduate school desegregation
cases; there were very few graduate and professional schools
available to blacks at the time, so advocating for admission to
white institutions became the only option.42
In a series of decisions beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme
Court began to articulate the contours of a constitutional right to
equality in cases requiring the admission of black applicants to
previously segregated state universities. These decisions focused
on the inherent unconstitutionality of the substantive racial
inequality in public higher education. Beginning in 1938, the
Supreme Court first recognized the inequality of segregation in
public higher education as a constitutional violation.43 In a
number of subsequent rulings, the courts fleshed out the
substantive right to equality in the realm of public higher
education. These decisions included striking down the use of state
funds as a means to send black applicants to private graduate
schools outside state borders rather than to educate them in
public white institutions within their state.44 It additionally
included requirements to admit black applicants to traditionally
42. In 1943, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina
had no professional schools for African Americans.
43. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938)
(explaining that a state could not pay for black students to attend graduate
school out of state—they had to build a new graduate school for black students
or integrate the existing white graduate schools); see also Pearson v. Murray,
182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936) (ordering, for the first time by any court of law
recognizing inequality of segregated higher education, that the University of
Maryland admit Donald G. Murray to its law school); Pearson, 182 A. at 593
(explaining that after Pearson, Maryland did not appeal the ruling to the United
States Supreme Court, so it did not result in nationally binding precedent).
44. See Pearson, 182 A. at 594 (“[T]he state has undertaken the function of
education in the law, but has omitted students of one race . . . solely because of
their color. If those students are to be offered equal treatment in the
performance of the function, they must, at present, be admitted to the one school
provided.”).
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white public universities45 and forbade states from circumscribing
their presence and movements in classrooms or campus
buildings.46
In the case that sounded the death knell for racial
segregation in higher education, the Supreme Court required
Texas to admit an African American applicant to the state law
school rather than a hastily-constructed school exclusively for
blacks.47 In Sweatt v. Painter, the Supreme Court offered the
most coherent and detailed explanation of a constitutional right
to a racially desegregated, equal education: 48
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is
no different from excluding white students from the new law
school. This contention overlooks realities. It is unlikely that a
member of a group so decisively in the majority, attending a
school with rich traditions and prestige which only a history of
consistently maintained excellence could command, would
claim that the opportunities afforded him for legal education
were unequal to those held open to petitioner. That such a
claim, if made, would be dishonored by the State, is no answer.
Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.49

Without exclusively overturning the existing constitutional
doctrine of “separate but equal” espoused in Plessy v. Ferguson50,
the Supreme Court nonetheless developed and articulated a
constitutional vision that all but ensured the Supreme Court
45. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 632, 633 (1948)
(requiring the University of Oklahoma to admit and enroll a black applicant in
the law school).
46. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637,
642 (1950) (explaining that “the conditions under which this appellant is
required to receive his education deprived him of his personal and present right
to the equal protection of the laws.”).
47. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (finding that
educational opportunities offered white and black law students by the state of
Texas were not substantially equal, and that the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment required that relator be admitted to the University of Texas
Law School).
48. See id. at 635–36 (explaining that legal education equivalent to that
offered by the State to students of other races is a full constitutional right).
49. Id. at 634–35 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (finding that
segregation is not unconstitutional if the segregated groups are treated equally).
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would reach the conclusion it famously reached in Brown v.
Board of Education51 four years later.
Brown represented the culmination of a lengthy litigation
strategy to dismantle racial apartheid in American public
education.52 By 1950, advocates had amassed enough legal
victories and experience in litigating complex constitutional cases
to shift strategies, graduating to attacking racial segregation in
education squarely, forcefully, and in multiple jurisdictions.53 It
was at this time that the strategy shifted to litigating primary
and secondary education cases.54 Thus, unlike prior Supreme
Court education decisions, the Brown case consolidated four cases
dealing exclusively with elementary and secondary public
schools.55 In striking down state-sponsored racial segregation in
these schools, the Supreme Court declared that “education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.”56 Because of this, the Supreme Court held, “where
the state has undertaken to provide [education, it] is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.”57 In
overturning Plessy, the Supreme Court held that “in the field of
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” and
amount to a deprivation of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Constitution.58

51. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 491–96 (1954) (declaring racial segregation
in public schools unconstitutional).
52. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 133–39 (1975)
(discussing how quantitative evidence provided proof that the theory behind
separate but equal was a fiction). See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN
THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 58–61, 85–87, 111–15 (1994).
53. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 135–37 (providing an overview of how
litigators attacked segregation directly).
54. Id.
55. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486 (explaining that the four consolidated
cases come from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware).
56. Id. at 493.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 495.
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B. Identifying a Constitutional Remedy: Brown II and its Progeny
Because of the complexities inherent in crafting a remedy to
attain the constitutional right articulated in Brown, the Supreme
Court left formulating the decrees for later.59 In Brown II, the
Supreme Court offered its first, timid articulation of a remedy to
restore equality in public education.60 In that decision, the
Supreme Court underscored the “practical flexibility,”61 the
“facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs,”
and consideration of administrative and local problems that are
inherent in exercising equity power to remedy this constitutional
violation.62 While many bemoaned the somewhat contradictory
tone of the opinion that called for an end to racial segregation
with “all deliberate speed,” the decision nonetheless laid the
foundation for courts to begin the long, arduous process of
crafting equitable remedies.63
In several cases over the next fifteen years, the Supreme
Court articulated with more force and clarity the contours of the
constitutional remedy for racially segregated education.64 As a
result of several factors, including the limited resources of
59. See id. (subordinating the issue of appropriate relief to the issue of
whether segregation was constitutional in public schools on re-argument
because the decisions in this class action suit had wide applicability, the local
conditions were varied, making the cases highly complex).
60. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (explaining that the court
realizes that the time required to implement the changes in schools will vary by
district and additional time may be given).
61. See id. at 300 (recognizing that different remedies may be required for
each particular case and granting the lower courts authority to decide as they
see fit).
62. See id. at 300–01 (considering some of the potential administrative
conflicts that the implementation of desegregation could create within local
governments and recognizing that courts may be required to grant extra time to
violators to solve them).
63. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 112 (1987) (indicating that the ambiguous definition of “all
deliberate speed” led to, in the author’s opinion, a ten-year delay in
implementation of desegregation).
64. See Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (requiring the
“supervisors” to levy taxes in order to adequately fund the county public
schools); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (requiring the “school
board . . . to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now.”).
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advocates and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to wrestle
with lower court decisions regarding higher education
desegregation, each of these opinions offered guidelines in the
context of primary and secondary education yet remained silent
on how to remedy the issue of segregation in public higher
education. When state governments attempted to defy the
Supreme Court’s order to desegregate—on the grounds that such
desegregation would cause too much public unrest—the Supreme
Court firmly stated:
State support of segregated schools through any arrangement,
management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the
Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The
right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in
schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive
that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.65

The Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he principles
announced [in Brown] . . . are indispensable for the protection of
the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us.
Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a
living truth.”66 Later, in cases like Green v. County School
Board,67 the Supreme Court held that simply removing the
explicit barriers to matriculation at white elementary and
secondary schools and adopting a “freedom of choice” plan for
student enrollment was unsatisfactory.68 Such a remedy both
placed an undue burden on black schoolchildren and was less
expedient or effective than alternate methods of desegregation.69
The Supreme Court called for a clear elimination of segregated
public schools, requiring “every school district . . . to terminate
the dual systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only

65. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 20.
67. See Green, 391 U.S. at 441–42 (declaring that schools have a burden to
create a desegregation plan that works quickly).
68. Id.
69. See id. (“[T]he plan has operated simply to burden children and their
parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School
Board.”).
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unitary schools.”70 Providing not only a mandate but also a road
map to public schools, the Supreme Court outlined a number of
factors to consider in determining whether a public school has
fulfilled its constitutional duty to desegregate.71 Public school
districts across the nation utilized these “Green factors” in
remedying their segregated school systems.72
Three years later, the Supreme Court further issued a decree
to eliminate all vestiges of segregation “root and branch” from
public schools.73 In Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of
Education, the Supreme Court granted district courts ample
freedom to fashion wide-ranging remedies that included courtmandated busing, redrawing of attendance zone lines, and using
mathematical ratios to desegregate students.74 The Supreme
Court explicitly extended these remedies in recognizing Latinos’
right to desegregation in 1973.75 While the Supreme Court
refused to extend the reach of desegregation remedies beyond the
borders where state-sponsored segregation took place,76 it
nonetheless continued to show a breadth in the range of equitable
remedies that could be ordered, including the use of remedial

70. Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 19 (1969).
71. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435–37 (1968) (describing
what factors district courts should consider when evaluating a school’s
desegregation plan).
72. See Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered
School Desegregation and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J.
POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 876 (2012) (indicating that the case “ultimately led
to substantial decreases in school segregation throughout the South.”).
73. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(explaining that district courts have broad power when constructing remedies to
desegregate schools).
74. See id. at 17 (indicating that “[a]s with any equity case, the nature of
the violation determines the scope of the remedy [, and i]n default by the school
authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad
power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.”).
75. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197–98 (1973) (explaining
that Hispanic students face the same discrimination as black students and may
also be treated as an identifiable class under the Fourteenth Amendment).
76. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (ruling that a
district court generally may not redraw the boundaries of an integrated school
district to desegregate another school district).
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education programs, curricular reform, and teacher training.77 All
of these equitable decrees set forth by the Supreme Court
provided a necessary foundation for the destabilization of an
apartheid system in public schools.78
C. The Complementary Relationship Between Social Movements
and Administrative and Adjudicatory Remedies
In addition to the essential role the aforementioned judicial
mandate and road map played in the desegregation of public
elementary and secondary schools in the wake of Brown, social
movements and ensuing geopolitical activity helped foster an
environment conducive to effectuating the court-ordered remedies
and spurring change. Such change occurred in large measure as a
result of tremendous public forces for desegregation at the time of
the ruling.79 In addition to the public outrage over acts of racial
violence,80 the United States played a global role in advocating for
a strong democracy. The maintenance of an apartheid system
77. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 272–74, 288 (1977) (explaining
that a district court may order remedial education programs to children who
have suffered from discrimination, and these programs may include service
training for educators and revised testing).
78. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 25, at 1022–25 (describing the tools
required in order to supervise institutional restructuring effectively).
79. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 123 (“If the United States is to
stand before the world as an exemplar of equality of rights . . . [i]t seems to us
that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment must be tortured out of
common meaning to make segregation practices in education anything except
unconstitutional” (quoting Equal Rights in Education, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
1948) at 22L)).
80. See, e.g., Jay Stewart, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free
Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 973–74 (2008) (“It took a hardened heart not to be
offended by nonviolent protesters being slammed against walls from the force of
fire hoses, set upon with police dogs and clubbed by baton-wielding cops, all
under the direction of Birmingham [Alabama]’s overtly racist police chief, T.
Eugene ‘Bull’ Connor.”). See also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King,
Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646 (1995) (“Massive non-violent civil
disobedience was met with equally intense violent police action . . . . black
children kneeling in prayer or singing spirituals as they walked down sidewalks
were attacked by vicious police dogs and rolled down the streets by fire
department water cannons.”).
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domestically while advocating for equality abroad made the
United States the subject of international derision.81 In these
school desegregation cases, the United States Department of
Justice filed amicus briefs highlighting the importance of foreign
policy to the issue of racial inequality in the nation: “[It] is in the
context of a world in which freedom and equality must become
living realities, if the democratic way of life is to survive, that the
issues of these cases should be viewed.”82 In a brief filed to the
Supreme Court in Brown, the Department of Justice focused even
more forcefully on the relationship between the “world struggle
between freedom and tyranny” and the problem of “racial
discrimination.”83
In addition to the social and geopolitical climate fostering the
destabilization of existing norms of racial inequality, subsequent
legislative and executive directives helped to spur real social
reform in public education. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination by any entity
receiving federal funds.84 This provided a strong mechanism for
forcing public elementary and secondary schools to make real the
right articulated in Brown I and the remedy outlined in

81. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR AND CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79–83 (2000) (explaining that some United States
politicians believed segregation harmed the United States’ foreign policy
relations during the Cold War era); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as Cold
War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–66 (1988) (describing how the
international community scrutinized American politicians and leaders who
advocated for democracy in a postwar world while dealing with racial
segregation at home).
82. See Dudziak, Desegregation as Cold War Imperative, supra note 81, at
109 (referring to how the Department of Justice’s articulated its stance against
school segregation in amicus briefs before the Supreme Court).
83. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 1954 & 1955, in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“The existence of
discrimination against minority groups in the United States has an adverse
effect upon our relations with the other countries.”).
84. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2016) (“No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
OF
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Brown II.85 Ultimately, the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and later the
newly-formed Department of Education, had real sway in shaping
the scope and meaning of school desegregation.86 Using its
enforcement power, the Office for Civil Rights produced
guidelines detailing the requirements for desegregating public
school districts.87
As a result of these collective forces, public elementary and
secondary schools became less segregated. The percentage of
black students in majority white schools in the South rose from 2
to 33 percent between 1964 and 1970.88 By the late 1980s, 44
percent of black students attended majority white schools.89
While political forces and administrative remedies
undoubtedly played a critical role in pressuring Supreme Court
movement toward outlining a constitutional right to public
education at all levels in the United States, it is only in the field
of elementary and secondary education that the Supreme Court
articulated a constitutional remedy in the form of equitable
decrees to effectuate Brown I & II.90 By offering a judicial
mandate for change, the Supreme Court actively upset existing
norms to such an extent that the abstract right could become
85. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding that the “separate but
equal” doctrine has no place in public education, and that segregation is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown
II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (deciding that local school boards and local courts
were responsible for implementing desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”).
86. See generally Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of
the Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School
Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008)
(focusing on the interaction between the federal and executive branches of
government concerning school integration after the end of school segregation).
87. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a) (2015) (allowing for enforcement through
termination of federal assistance proceedings carried out by the Department of
Justice or State or local courts).
88. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. C. R. PROJECT, RACIAL
TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 13 (2006)
(analyzing how school segregation still exists today).
89. Id.
90. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (finding that “segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprives [the children of the
minority group] of equal educational opportunities” and violates the Fourteenth
Amendment); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring that desegregation be carried
out quickly and enforced by local and district courts).
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more of a practical reality. In the absence of such destabilization
for higher education, public colleges and universities remained
segregated for many decades to come.91 By the time the Supreme
Court offered a remedy nearly forty years after the Brown ruling,
the judicial, social, and political momentum for wide-ranging
equitable remedies had passed.
III. The Case of Public Higher Education: Where did the
Court Go?
Many advocates and scholars see structural reform as an
imperfect, unwieldy tool to effect change. Indeed, in the context of
school desegregation, implementing successful remedies
confounded jurists and advocates due to deeply entrenched
residential segregation, intractable economic inequality, and
pervasive racial hostility.92 Nonetheless, remedies articulated by
the highest Court offer a powerful foundation from which to begin
the process of change. The role of equitable remedies in giving
meaning to the constitutional right to racial equality in education
is to eliminate the very conditions that create and maintain
systems of inequality.93 Structural reform litigation offsets the
“negatives” of its unwieldiness with the “positives” of creating an
environment for long-term change.
The destabilization brought by adjudicatory enforcement
helped create the fertile ground for ensuing administrative
directives and regulatory enforcement that gave meaning to

91. See Knight v. Alabama, 476 F.3d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[M]any
of the State’s policies governing higher education tended to perpetuate its
formerly de jure segregated university system.”); Peter Applebome, College
Segregation Persists, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/18/us/college-segregation-persists-studysays.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (noting that more than eighty percent of
students at most flagship universities in the South were white in 1995) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
92. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (finding that
school districts are only required to restrict de jure segregation, and have no
obligation to provide salary increases or remedial education in order to combat
de facto segregation).
93. See Fiss, supra note 26, at 32 (providing a critique on structural
reform).
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Brown’s call for equality in educational opportunity.94 The
Supreme Court’s failure to articulate such a remedy in public
higher education may occur for a host of complex reasons,
including the structure of higher education and its governance,
the unique role of historically black colleges, and changes to
Supreme Court composition in the years following Brown.95
A. Distinguishing Public Higher Education
Even in the instances where higher education desegregation
cases entered the courts in Brown’s wake,96 there are a number of
factors that may have contributed to the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to articulate equitable remedies for higher education
segregation. The context of American higher education differs
significantly from public elementary and secondary schools in a
number of ways. For instance, while the United States has
provided free, compulsory elementary and secondary education
since the early nineteenth century,97 American public colleges
94. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Geier v. Univ. of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1065 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979) (finding that Tennessee had a duty to do more
than have an open admissions policy for its public universities because Brown I
and Brown II apply to public higher education as well as primary and secondary
education); Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1369
(E.D. Va. 1971) (indicating that “Bland [a two-year institution and agency of the
state], cannot impede another agency of the state, Virginia State, in its efforts to
fully integrate it student body[;]. . . [t]herefore, . . .we will enjoin Bland and its
parent, William and Mary [a four-year institution], from escalating Bland into a
four-year college”), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Visitors of the Coll. of William & Mary
v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971); Ala. State Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. &
Coll. Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784, 787–88 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (declining to exercise
equitable power to impose a desegregation remedy in the case of dual system of
higher education, stating, “[w]e too are reluctant at this time to go much beyond
preventing discriminatory admissions”), aff’d per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
But see Frasier v. Bd. of Transp., 134 F. Supp. 589, 592 (M.D. N.C. 1955)
(confirming that Brown I applied to higher education), aff’d, 350 U.S. 979
(1956).
97. See Lisa M. Lukasik, The Latest Home Education Challenge: The
Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1913,
1918 (1996) (“Massachusetts passed the nation’s first compulsory attendance
law in 1852. By the early twentieth century, every state in the nation required
school attendance.”).
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and universities are neither free nor compulsory.98 Rather, even
public universities have competitive admissions processes and
come at a cost.99 In addition, public elementary and secondary
schools are thought to be more fungible. While many would
contest the notion that all public elementary and secondary
schools are equal, the Brown Court acknowledged as much in its
opinion.100 Colleges and universities vary more in terms of
prestige and quality. Further, while advocates focused their
litigation efforts outside of higher education, lower courts
questioned the practicality of heavy adjudicative involvement in
educational policy for colleges and universities when courts were
already so heavily involved in the governance of elementary and
secondary schools.101 Thus, the Supreme Court declined to enter
the thicket—even when given the opportunity—due to conflicting
lower court decisions.102 Without a mandate from the high Court,
lower courts struggled for a clearly defined adjudicatory remedy.

98. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION, xii (1960) (“Public education beyond high school . . .
is offered by every State, and its importance to the Nation’s welfare and security
is being recognized more and more, still it is neither provided for all nor
compelled of any.”).
99. See John W. Schoen, Why does a college degree cost so much?, CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/16/why-college-costs-are-so-high-and-rising.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (explaining the cost of both private and public
universities today and tracking the increase in cost through history) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
100. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
101. See, e.g., Lorne Fienberg, United States v. Fordice and the
Desegregation of Public Higher Education: Groping for Root and Branch, 34 B.C.
L. REV. 803, 850 (1993) (arguing that historically black colleges should not be
merged with white universities or closed because they serve the important
purpose of creating “greater access and enhanced educational opportunities for
black students.”).
102. Compare Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368,
1373 (E.D. Va. 1971) (explaining that Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968) “defined a constitutional duty owed as well to college students”) aff’d sub
nom. Bd. of Visitors of the Coll. of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907
(1971), with Ala. State Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. & Coll. Auth., 289 F.
Supp. 784, 787–88 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (declining to exercise equitable power to
impose a desegregation remedy in the case of dual system of higher education),
aff’d per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
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B. Role of HBCUs

For decades, many traditionally white public colleges and
universities struggled to fulfill the constitutional duty set forth in
Brown II. A number of institutions persistently closed their doors
to African American applicants after the decision.103 In addition
to the well-established white institutions, remedial jurisprudence
regarding public higher education would have to contend with the
dilemma of how to resolve the fate of those historically black
public colleges that held an incongruous position in American
history. For nearly a century, historically black colleges and
universities were largely the only institutions of higher learning
open to blacks in the United States.104 As such, historically black
institutions have served a critical role in educating African
American students during segregation and beyond.105 These
103. See generally ROBERT A. PRATT, WE SHALL NOT BE MOVED: THE
DESEGREGATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA (2002) (recalling the life of
Horace Ward, an African American student who was instrumental in the
desegregation of the University of Georgia); see Thomas D. Russell, “Keep
Negroes Out of Most Classes Where There Are a Large Number of Girls”: The
Unseen Power of the Ku Klux Klan and Standardized Testing at the University
of Texas, 1899–1999, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010) (detailing the battle for
desegregation at the University of Texas). Some public institutions did take
early steps to eliminate segregation. In 1951, for instance, the University of
Louisville admitted black students to all of its programs, simultaneously closing
the branch of the university that had previously operated for black students. See
Jack Greenberg, Racial Integration of Teachers—A Growing Problem, 20 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 285, 294 (1951) (“In 1950, the Kentucky General Assembly
amended the State’s Day law, which requires segregation in education, by
permitting boards of trustees of institutions of higher learning to open their
classes to Negroes. . . . The University of Louisville greeted the law by voting to
abolish segregation . . . .”).
104. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HISTORICALLY BLACK
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION DESEGREGATION 1 (Mar.
1991), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq9511.html (last visited
Apr. 26, 2017) (“[P]ublic support for higher education for black students was
[governed by the] Second Morrill Act . . . [which] required states with racially
segregated public higher education systems to provide a land-grant institution
for black students whenever a [one] was established and restricted for white
students”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
105. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 748 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (finding that historically black colleges have not only survived, but
have flourished and “expanded as opportunities for blacks to enter historically
white institutions have expanded.”).
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institutions have their own traditions and alumni base.
Perpetuating racial segregation and white supremacy, however,
were also motivating factors for the construction and minimal
maintenance of black public colleges and universities.106
Once Brown II outlawed state mandated apartheid, states
were required to do something to address the long-standing racial
segregation and inequality that existed in systems of higher
education.107 Unfortunately, there was no clear path as to what
that something should entail.108 One alternative remedy involved
the transformation of HBCUs via increased funding and
enhanced programmatic options, thus increasing their
desirability as alternatives to traditionally white institutions for
students of all races.109 An alternate remedy was to dismantle
black public colleges, as they were deemed tools of racial
segregation.110 Without hope for a true and immediate
destabilization of the existing apartheid structure, however,
many African Americans pushed back against the elimination of
existing institutions.111 Even in more recent years, efforts to close
106. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 1 (noting that HBCUs
were created “to serve the educational needs of black Americans . . . [who] were
generally denied admission to traditionally white institutions.”).104
107. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (concluding that racial
discrimination in public educational institutions is unconstitutional and
directing the lower courts to implement conforming measures and revise local
law).
108. See id. at 301 (providing ways that local courts may revise their publicschool admission policies and state law, but failing to specify or mandate these
revisions).
109. See Scott Jaschik, Defining Desegregation, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 22,
2012),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/22/federal-judge-getsready-decide-suit-supporters-marylands-historically-black (last visited Apr. 26,
2017) (citing the stark difference between the amount of state funds allocated to
historically white public universities and those allocated to historically black
public universities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
110. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL
SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 263 (1998)
(“There is some fear that [Fordice] imperils [HBCUs] . . . If the Court applied
the same standard to higher-education desegregation that it applied to
elementary . . . education . . . HBCUs would be viewed as vestiges of a dual
system and would . . . be eliminated.”).
111. See Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black
Public College: The Era of Separate but Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29, 33 (1987)
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HBCUs have met with criticism that such a remedy may impose
significant educational and social costs on African American
communities.112
While constitutional doctrine required an end to state
mandated apartheid in public education, colleges and universities
lacked any judicial roadmap as to how to implement a remedial
structure.113 As such, historically black colleges and universities
remained in a “twilight zone.”114 Compared to traditionally white
institutions, these colleges and universities suffered from
substandard
facilities,
unequal
state
funding,
paltry
endowments, and no blueprint for fostering racially integrated
student bodies.115 Without the force of a clearly outlined
adjudicatory remedy, states operated without any clarity as to

(discussing how proponents of black colleges contend that historically black
colleges provide opportunities to preserve black traditions, culture, and other
educational options).
112. See, e.g., Charise Frazier, Lawmakers Vote to Shutter SC State
University to Manage Deficit, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13 2015, 5:18 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/lawmakers-vote-shutter-sc-stateuniversity-manage-deficit-n305396 (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (discussing how
the legislature voted to close South Carolina’s “only public historically black
college”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice). In addition,
The Congressional Black Caucus, . . . outraged that some members of
the South Carolina legislature have an interest in closing the
[HBCU], calling this ‘overreaching and overreacting . . . .’ Chairman
G. K. Butterfield, (D-NC) continued, ‘There are many remedies
available to the state’s government without using the nuclear option
of closing the institution.’
Id.
113. See Walter Recharde Allen & Joseph O. Jewell, A Backward Glance
Forward: Past, Present and Future Perspectives on Historically Black Colleges
and Universities, 25 THE REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 241, 250–51 (2002) (discussing
the lack of judicial guidance in implementing segregation practices in colleges
and universities after Brown).
114. See John K. Pierre & Charity R. Welch, Why Historically Black Colleges
and Universities are Needed in the 21st Century, 1 J. RACE, GENDER, & POVERTY
101, 111 (2010) (“While legal barriers to equality have been eliminated, socioeconomic barriers to equality still exist. Disparities are present in educational
opportunities, educational attainment, and access to health care for racial
minorities.”).
115. See Kujovich, supra note 111, at 44–112 (addressing issues including
inequality of funding, programs of instruction, the consequences of separation,
and segregation of the curriculum).
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how to dismantle segregated systems of higher education and
foster equality in educational opportunity.116
C. Judicial Retreat from Racial Remedies
While the Supreme Court remained silent on remedial
structures for higher education desegregation, it began to eschew
adjudicatory remedies for discrimination generally and for the
type of sweeping racial remedies outlined in Brown II and its
early progeny.117 Changes in Supreme Court composition and in
social and political climate meant a swift end to the most
opportune time for creative use of the Supreme Court’s equitable
powers in the area of educational equality.118 As early as 1973,
reshaped by four new Justices, the Supreme Court substantially
limited the judicial remedies available to low-income and
minority students in disadvantaged schools in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez.119 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that the
United States Constitution creates no fundamental right to
education, nor is wealth a protected class; consequently, there is
no constitutional violation for a state’s provision of inequitable
educational resources.120 One year later, the Supreme Court
rejected metropolitan desegregation, the only available route to
successfully desegregate the racially segregated schools in the
urban core of Detroit, Michigan.121 In the limited avenues that
116. See id. at 113 (describing the inequalities between historically black
and white universities in addition to the difficulties and delay states had in
instituting any graduate instruction in black public colleges).
117. See id. at 32 (suggesting that the course of desegregation in public
colleges has been delegated to the lower federal courts after Brown II).
118. See id. at 31 (“The current racial identifiability of black public colleges
suggests that the disestablishment remedy has not been carried out and that
the constitutional violation therefore persists in public higher education.”).
119. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973)
(finding that there is no Constitutional fundamental right to education).
120. See id. at 30–39 (exploring whether the right to education is implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution and determining that education issues should
fall under the purview of the benefits provided by the States rather than under
Federal or Constitutional protection).
121. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (concluding that local
control over school operations and local autonomy over school transportation
issues are essential to maintaining community support for the public schools
and educational process).
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remain, the Supreme Court has used doctrines such as remedies
and federalism to curb their accessibility.122 In a series of
opinions in the 1990s, a conservative Court led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist issued a trilogy of opinions that severely curtailed the
circumstances, means, and duration of school desegregation
remedies.123 Understanding the persistence of racial injustice but
exhibiting exhaustion with continued remedial decrees, the
Supreme Court provided states with multiple avenues for relief
from injunctions, even when some vestiges of desegregation
remained, and even in cases where it was clear resegregation
would occur.124
In the context of higher education, the Supreme Court
appeared poised to tolerate only minimal state efforts toward the
broad concept of racial diversity rather than the more structured,
vigorous racial remedies set forth in earlier opinions addressing
public elementary and secondary education.125 Thus, institutions
122. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (“[L]ocal autonomy of
school districts is a vital national tradition, . . . and that a district court must
strive to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system
operating in compliance with the Constitution.”).
123. See id. at 138 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “federal courts
should [not use] racial equality as a pretext for solving social problems that do
not violate the Constitution.”); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491
(1992) (“[T]he court may determine that it will not order further remedies in the
area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a
proximate way, to constitutional violations.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 238 (1991) (concluding that “the legal justification for displacement of local
authority in [desegregation attempts] is a violation of the Constitution.”).
124. See, e.g., Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248–51 (calling for the District Court to
review every facet of school operation to determine whether de jure segregation
had ended); see also Pitts, 503 U.S. at 490–91 (“While retaining jurisdiction, . . .
the court may determine that it will not order further remedies in areas where
the school district is in compliance with the decree.”); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 97–
98, 100–02 (arguing the importance of allowing local districts to retain
autonomy over their schools and concluding that directing districts on exactly
how to achieve of “desegregative attractiveness” is beyond the discretion of the
District Court).
125. Compare Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–20
(1978) (stating that a state may constitutionally consider race as a factor in its
university admissions to promote educational diversity, but only if considered
alongside other factors and on a case-by-case basis), with Brown II, 349 U.S.
294, 301 (1955) (demanding that all U.S. schools must desegregate with all
deliberate speed), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 29–32 (1971) (noting that busing is an appropriate remedy for righting racial
imbalance in schools).
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of higher education tried to proactively address continuing
inequality through measures that became known as “affirmative
action.”126 In 1978, the Supreme Court invalidated the admission
plan of the University of California-Davis Medical School, which
reserved 16 of 100 places in each entering class for racial
minorities.127 In doing so, however, the divided Supreme Court
did allow for the limited use of race as a positive factor in
admissions.128 The Supreme Court cautiously embraced a new
constitutional framework for sustaining race-conscious measures
that state universities voluntarily adopted to foster integration in
education.129 This framework, while permitting some raceconscious policies, operates explicitly outside of the remedial
context and arguably rests on a very different constitutional
foundation.130 Instead of a constitutional interest developed with
an understanding of the persistent vestiges of racial segregation
that was baked into the founding of the nation, affirmative action
jurisprudence allows for the use of race in a historical vacuum.131
Without connecting such policies to their original purpose—
remedying pervasive racial discrimination and segregation in
higher education—it is easier for opponents of such policies to
challenge them and to redefine the terms of the debate.132 While
126. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 343 app. (“In administering a program regarding
which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to
overcome the effects of prior discrimination.”).
127. See id. at 275 (explaining the process of the admission committee when
reviewing minority applicants).
128. See id. at 320 (“[T]he State has a substantial interest that legitimately
may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.”).
129. See id. at 312 (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments
as to education includes the selection of its student body.”).
130. See id. at 368 (“Congress was empowered under that provision to accord
preferential treatment to victims of past discrimination . . . and we see no
reason to conclude that the States cannot voluntarily accomplish . . . what
Congress . . . validly may authorize or compel either the States or private
persons to do.”).
131. See Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goal of
Educational Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 177 (2005)
(explaining the “flaws in the contemporary strategy and remedies used to
address the violation of rights that the Court acknowledged in Brown.”).
132. See Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Abigail Fisher’s Affirmative Action
(June
23,
2016),
Case
Was
Really
About,
PROPUBLICA
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ostensibly challenging “affirmative action,” today’s litigation
challenges are part of a broader attack on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.133 While the measure was
drafted during Reconstruction to ensure the rights of African
Americans, the question has become whether this clause of the
U.S. Constitution now prohibits any use of race to help overcome
the country’s “legacy of racism.”134
As a result of shifts in the Supreme Court composition and
social and political climate, the Supreme Court disfavors courtbased remedies altogether, favoring only limited, forward-looking
“diversity” rationales.135 Even the limited use of race in college
admissions “who point to the educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity,”136 such as increased cross racial
understanding and democratic involvement, is now in jeopardy.137
This “jurisprudence of fragmentation”138 operates on two tracks, a
https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblind-constitution-what-abigailfishers-affirmative-action-case-is-r (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (“Nearly 60 years
after that Supreme Court victory [in Brown], which changed the nation,
conservatives freely admit they have stolen that page from the NAACP’s legal
playbook as they attempt to roll back many of the civil rights group’s landmark
triumphs”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
133. See id. (“At issue is whether the Constitution’s equal protection clause,
drafted by Congress during Reconstruction to ensure the rights of black
Americans, also prohibits the use of race to help them overcome the nation’s
legacy of racism.”).
134. See id. (deciding whether the Equal Protection Clause can be
implemented to prevent race being used as a factor in government programs).
135. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, 328 (2003) (concluding that
institutions of higher education could establish affirmative action admissions
programs to further the institution’s important interest in cultivating a diverse
student body); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 258–59 (2003) (establishing that
the University of Michigan’s undergrad affirmative action policy with
predetermined point allocations was unconstitutional).
136. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (describing petitioner’s claim that
increasing student body diversity is a compelling interest).
137. See id. (“As the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions
policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races.’”).
138. See Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1322 (2008)
(describing three different ways in which Gutter v. Bollinger played a part in
undoing voluntary desegregation).
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“remedial” track and a “diversity” track.139 Each track arguably
emanates from the same constitutional right identified in Brown
II and its antecedents, but offers completely disparate theories of
jurisprudence.140 For decades now, the Supreme Court has
disfavored a “remedial justification” for race conscious policies,
which previously served as the foundation for equitable remedies
in higher education desegregation.141
D. A Court Articulated Remedy for Higher Education Segregation:
Fordice
In 1992, nearly forty years after Brown II, the Supreme
Court ruled on equitable remedies for the desegregation of public
higher education for the first time.142 The United States v.
Fordice143 decision brought to a close a seventeen-year legal
battle, including more than a decade of court-supervised
negotiations, a five-week trial in the lower court, more than
50,000 pages of evidence,144 and two rulings by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.145 While the Supreme

139. See id. at 1321–22 (explaining how the courts have taken a race
conscious approach to undo past discrimination while the courts have also
recognized the diversity rational to learn from individual’s various
backgrounds).
140. See id. at 1321 (discussing how Brown “endors[ed] a normative ideal of
colorblindness, while others insisted that Brown recognized that raceconsciousness was necessary to undo longstanding patters of segregation,
subordination, and stratification.”).
141. See id. at 1366 (“Culture-race becomes an insupportable justification
because the Court fears that quota systems will intensify racial divisions rather
than create a space for the development of racial identities.”).
142. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992) (establishing
that universities in Mississippi had not properly integrated).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 725 (“At trial’s end, based on the testimony of 71 witnesses
and 56,700 pages of exhibits, the District Court entered extensive findings of
fact.”).
145. See Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1560 (N.D. Miss. 1987)
(establishing that state officials are meeting their duty to disestablish the
segregated system in higher education); Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 756 (5th
Cir. 1990) (finding that state officials failed to uphold their duty and, in turn,
are guilty of maintaining a racially dual system in higher education); Ayers v.
Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (concluding that state
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Court outlined the broad remedial requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Fordice
ruling left the specifics of a constitutionally sound equitable
remedy to the lower courts.146 Of particular note, it set forth a
significantly less robust mandate than that which guided
elementary and secondary school segregation for the prior four
decades.147 In addition, it did so in a dramatically different
political, social, and judicial climate than the post-Brown 1960s
that gave birth to strong civil rights legislation and jurisprudence
that spoke forcefully of the affirmative duty to eradicate racially
segregated public education.148
In today’s “post-racial” America, we had an African American
president and a populace who feels more exhaustion than outrage
when confronted with persistent racial inequality and
segregation.149 Courts disfavor race-based remedies for existing
racial inequality in a host of areas, including education,
employment, and housing.150 In the context of higher education,
officials failed to try and dismantle the segregated system in higher education
by not implementing new policies).
146. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743 (“Whether such an increase in funding is
necessary to achieve a full dismantlement under the standards we have
outlined, however, is a different question, and one that must be addressed on
remand.”).
147. See Chaka M. Patterson, Desegregation as a Two-Way Street: The
Aftermath of United States v. Fordice, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 391–92 (1994)
(“The differences between the remedies available to elementary and secondary
institutions as compared to institutions of higher education are indeed
significant.”).
148. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992) (concluding that
the state must dismantle the prior dual system according to their affirmative
duty under the Constitution and Title VI).
149. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE
RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 316 (2005) (quoting Professor
Roger Wilkins and explaining that many Americans feel “moral exhaustion”
regarding racial integration efforts).
150. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (discussing how a city
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to promote nonblack firefighters after they passed a promotion test); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995) (explaining that courts
use the strict scrutiny standard when evaluating affirmative action cases
involving federal agency contracting); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
335–36 (2003) (finding that seeking a “critical mass” of minority students is
acceptable, while setting a “quota” for minority students is not). But see Adam
Weiss, Grutter, Community, and Democracy: The Case for Race-Conscious
Remedies in Residential Segregation Suits, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1195, 1196
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adjudicatory enforcement and social policy favor more “universal”
courses of action with only limited consideration of race to further
“student body diversity,” rather than for the purpose of
remedying present effects of past discrimination.151 Courts are
loathe to take notice of the need for remedies for long-standing
segregative and discriminatory policies.152 Instead, courts have
more often absolved states of any responsibility or requirement in
favor of allowing measures fostering diversity.153 The result is
that even in the limited instances in which race conscious state
policies in education have withstood constitutional scrutiny, it is
for the justification of furthering student body diversity, rather
than remedying discrimination.154 In addition, it is in the context
of voluntary efforts by state institutions, rather than adjudicatory
enforcement.155

(2007) (arguing that it is consistent with the Equal protection clause that judges
may tailor race-conscious solutions to foster racial integration).
151. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989)
(articulating that the standard of strict scrutiny applies to race-conscious
policies regardless of whether the policy is designed to discriminate or to provide
a benefit); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12
(1978) (“The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse
student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education.”).
152. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (holding that thirty percent quota allowed
by the plan was not “narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright
racial balancing.”); see also Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[I]t is completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race
will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent
unlawful discrimination.”).
153. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Majority Politics and Race Based
Remedies, 50 HOW. L.J. 827, 829 (2007) (discussing how courts have allowed
states to remedy some of their own discrimination issues).
154. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (stating that “[t]he freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body.”).
155. See id. at 336 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the Congressional intent
to encourage voluntary compliance).
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E. Impact on Administrative Remedies

Without the power of court ordered remedies to mandate the
desegregation of traditionally white institutions (TWI) or the
HBCUs, public higher education in the United States remained
deeply segregated.156 Lower courts adjudicated claims of racial
segregation and inequality in higher education without guidance
from the Supreme Court and reached conflicting, muddled
results.157
Even in ideal conditions, the difficulties inherent in
structural reform litigation merit a corresponding consideration
of legislative and executive avenues for change. Through
subsequent federal political activity, administrative remedies can
help fill adjudicatory voids, or further the aims of existing
adjudicatory remedies, as was the case with elementary and
secondary school desegregation.158 Lacking the destabilizing
effect of a judicially articulated remedy in higher education,
however, administrative remedies operated at a sluggish pace.159
No administrative guidelines for the desegregation of public
higher education existed for more than twenty years after the
156. See Walter Recharde Allen & Joseph O. Jewell, A Backward Glance
Forward: Past, Present and Future Perspectives on Historically Black Colleges
and Universities, 25 THE REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 241, 250–51 (2002) (discussing
the inequalities in higher education after Brown).
157. See Lia B. Epperson, Resisting Retreat: The Struggle for Equality in
Educational Opportunity in the Post-Brown Era, 66 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 131,
133–34 (explaining the difficulties associated with enforcing desegregation in
education).
158. See Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration
Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. OF AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146, 147 (2008)
(discussing the executive and judicial interaction concerning the scope of school
integration); see also Lia Epperson, Legislating Inclusion, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 91, 92–93 (2012) (examining congressional enforcement of racial equality
in education); see generally Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential
Limitations and Legislative Opportunities, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213 (2011)
(discussing the efficacy of administrative directives and regulatory enforcement
over traditional adjudicatory remedies for fulfilling constitutional equality
imperatives).
159. In 1973, a federal court set forth a roadmap for the desegregation of
HBCUs, offering a hybrid of regulatory and judicial remedy. See Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring the federal
government to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act more aggressively).
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Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.160 By the time the federal
judiciary stepped in to call for more aggressive administrative
enforcement, the “perfect storm” of judicial activism and social
and political momentum that fostered significant change in
elementary and secondary schools had largely dissolved.161
F. Example of Maryland
Public colleges and universities in the state of Maryland
provide an interesting example of the difficulty in attaining a
sound model for desegregation and educational equality in the
absence of adjudicative remedies or a strong push for
administrative enforcement. Even after the 1954 Supreme Court
ruling that racially segregated education violated the
Constitution, Maryland failed to adequately remedy the century
long de jure system of racially segregated higher education.162
Prior to 1954, the state forced black students to attend schools
that lacked sufficient funding, facilities or programmatic
opportunities when compared with TWIs in the state.163 It was
not until 2000 that Maryland entered into an agreement with the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights to bring
the state into compliance with constitutional and legislative
requirements. In 2006, however, a group of prospective students,
current students, and alumni of the state’s four historically black
colleges and universities brought a lawsuit alleging that the state
160. In the area of elementary and secondary school desegregation, OCR
implemented regulations in 1967. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1–80.13 (2017) (stating
that “[t]he purpose of this part is to effectuate the provisions of title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964” which attempts to end racial discrimination).
161. See Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and
Legislative Opportunities supra note 158, at 219 (explaining that the Supreme
Court declined to address racial issues in elementary and secondary schools,
among other forums).
162. See Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration
Jurisprudence, supra note 158, at 157 (explaining that the University of
Maryland’s campus “remained ninety-nine percent white in the late 1960s.”).
163. See John K. Pierre, History of De Jure Segregation in Public Higher
Education in America and the State of Maryland Prior to 1954 and the
Equalization Strategy, 8 FLA. A & M UNIV. L. REV. 81, 88–89 (2012) (discussing
the differences in educational facilities between African-Americans and whites
in Maryland).
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had failed to successfully dismantle the vestiges of racial
segregation in the areas of funding, capital improvements, and
program duplication.164 After six years of litigation, the court
heard arguments in October 2012 and has yet to issue a decision.
The state of Maryland’s continued battle regarding the
desegregation of public higher education illustrates how, in the
absence of a mandate from the Supreme Court, the quest for an
equitable remedy in higher education has been foiled by contested
definitions of the very notion of desegregation. The Supreme
Court squarely defined “desegregation” decades before in the
realm of elementary and secondary education in cases like Green,
holding that states had an “affirmative duty” to remove all
vestiges of discrimination “root and branch,”165 eschewing plans
that simply removed explicit racial prohibitions as insufficient.
There is no similar directive for colleges and universities. HBCUs
contend that the state of Maryland never met its obligation to
make the schools “comparable and competitive” with traditional
white institutions.166 Maryland’s traditionally white institutions,
like their counterparts in other southern states, received
preferential treatment from the state for decades.167 This resulted
in persistent inequities in facilities, programmatic offerings,
faculty, and scholarships for students.168 HBCUs in the state
have consistently called for increased funding for new programs
and facilities that would attract students of all races.169
The state body governing higher education, however, argues
that desegregation should be defined simply as providing
164. See generally Coal. for Equity and Excellence in Md. Higher Educ. v.
Md. Higher Educ. Comm’n, No. CCB-06-2773, 2011 WL 2217481 (D. Md. June 6,
2011) (examining types of funding in the context of higher education.).
165. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (describing how
“[s]chool boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual
systems were clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated.”).
166. See Jaschik, supra note 109 (discussing the arguments in support of
funding new initiatives and facilities for historically black colleges) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
167. See id. (explaining that traditionally white institutions have also
received preferential treatment regarding funding).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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prospective students with the freedom to choose to attend any
public college or university in the state and removing explicit
racial barriers from admission.170 By this definition, the state of
Maryland has more than fulfilled its duty, as the vast majority of
African American students in the state attend traditionally white
institutions today.171 However, this is a definition of a remedy
that was squarely dismissed by the Supreme Court in earlier
opinions regarding primary education.172
These contested definitions of desegregation flow from
contested views of the role of history. A study of Maryland and
the quest for desegregated higher education also provides a
worthwhile illustration of the role of history, and the ways in
which state governments used HBCUs as tools to enforce
segregation.173 From 1926 to 1936, HBCUs received roughly 25
percent of the funding that traditionally white institutions
received.174 Today, the state governing body has called such
history immaterial to existing disparities in infrastructure.175
Rather than vestiges of segregation, the state sees them as
irrelevant since all students are now provided a choice of public
colleges and universities. In other words, no student, regardless
of race, need attend the financially crippled HBCUs.
Finally, the case of Maryland provides an interesting view
into the role of research. In examining avenues for altering
historical patterns of racially segregated college and university
attendance, research findings suggested creating high demand,
170. Id.
171. See id. (citing state’s argument that in 2012, fifty-nine percent of
African American students enrolled in public four year colleges or universities
in Maryland attended institutions other than HBCUs, and going on to assert
that this figure rises to eighty-one percent if including community colleges and
private institutions).
172. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968) (rejecting the
New Kent School Board’s “freedom of choice” plan as insufficient plan for
remedying segregation).
173. Jaschik, supra note 109.
174. See id. (noting that one traditionally white institution in the state of
Maryland received $742,000, while three HBCUs received a combined total of
$774,000 over a span of 10 years between 1926 and 1936).
175. See id. (“The state argues that enrollment figures show that all
Maryland colleges are open to students of all races, and says that the ‘vast
majority’ of black students attend institutions other than historically black
colleges.”).
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unique programs at HBCUs. The theory, adopted from school
desegregation litigation strategy leading to Brown, is that “green
follows white.”176 By enticing white enrollment to HBCUs, money
would follow. The issue at stake in the current Maryland
litigation centers largely on the allegation that the state is
perpetuating segregation by “unnecessarily duplicating” scores of
academic programs offered at HBCUs at traditionally white
institutions.177 In 2013, the case remains open.178 The district
court has yet to issue a remedial opinion to determine whether or
what remedy may be available to fix the broken system.
IV. Conclusion
An examination of some of the challenges of seeking racial
equality in higher education provides a striking refutation of the
oft-cited argument that constitutional injunctions have been
ineffective in spurring social change. On the contrary, equitable
decrees in education cases have served a critical function in
destabilizing apartheid norms.179 Such adjudicatory remedies
provided fertile ground to allow for the ensuing regulatory
176. See, e.g., Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Still Separate and Still Unequal, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 692 (1995) (describing “green follows white” as a
phrase commonly used in African American communities to describe the
phenomenon of money and other resources being spent on other projects when
an area’s white population leaves and is replaced by a black population).
177. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 40, Coal. For Equity and Excellence in
Md. Higher Educ. v. Md. Higher Educ. Comm’n, (D. Md. Jun. 6, 2011) (No.
06CV02773) (“In 1965, however, rather than encourage integration at Morgan
State, Maryland established University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC).
UMBC was a complete duplication of Morgan State’s entire institution, not just
its programs.”).
178. Coal. for Equity and Excellence in Md. Higher Educ. v. Md. Higher
Educ. Comm’n, No. CCB-06-2773, 2011 WL 2217481 (D. Md. June 6, 2011).
179. See Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 318 (7th Cir. 1980)
(“Indeed, it appears that school desegregation is one of the areas in which
voluntary resolution is preferable to full litigation because the spirit of
cooperation inherent in good faith settlement is essential to the true long-range
success of any desegregation remedy”), overruled by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d
873 (1998); see also Kathleen Snyder Schoene, Note, Voluntarily Unlocking the
Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class Action Consent Decrees in School
Desegregation, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1305, 1309 (1982) (“Voluntary resolution in
school desegregation is preferable to full litigation because the cooperation
inherent in a settlement ensures the long-range success of the desegregation
plan.”).
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enforcement and administrative directives to take hold. Equitable
decrees, complemented by other equality initiatives from federal
political branches, produced significant social reform in primary
education. For the years when the factors worked together,
American public schools became more racially inclusive, and
students garnered academic, social, and “democratic” benefits
that have been well documented in social science research.180
As was the case in elementary and secondary education,
courts could have used equitable power in more radical ways in
higher education to undermine the existing structure of racial
inequality.181 Some options included requiring traditionally white
institutions to merge with black institutions to achieve racial
balancing, but placing the closure burden on the white
institutions. By creatively assessing varied equitable remedies,
the Supreme Court could come closer to fulfilling the equal
protection requirement set forth in Brown in a manner that may
benefit students of all races. In the absence of a constitutionally
defined remedy for higher education, however, states failed to act
to effectuate the constitutionally articulated right outlined in
Brown I. This glaring absence of any Supreme Court decision
outlining equitable remedies for the constitutional violation of
racially segregated and discriminatory colleges and universities
allowed for the existing inequality to continue unfettered for
decades.

180. See Lia Epperson, The Promise and Pitfalls of Empiricism in
Educational Equality Jurisprudence, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 489, 513–515
(2013) (examining social science research data and other empirical evidence to
advocate for the increased use of race-conscious policies to foster diversity and
improved educational outcomes).
181. Sabel & Simon, supra note 25.

